Justification and Explanation in the Israel-Palestine Conflict

I’ve noticed a frustrating dynamic over recent weeks in the already exasperating debates about the Israel-Palestine conflict. Both “sides”, for converse reasons, have been deploying an equivocation between justification and explanation when discussing the October 7th attacks by Hamas. I wanted to briefly highlight this dynamic, as it’s one of many patterns in the discourse that leads to impasse and mutual resentment.

There are two ways of evaluating the atrocities of October 7th. One is to try to understand the motivational backdrop — the psychological, sociological and political histories that led to those attacks. Another is to try to render a judgment on the moral status of those acts. These two evaluational approaches are, in principle at least, logically distinct. However, there is a slight asymmetry here. I can give an account purely of the motivational backdrop without venturing a judgment on the moral status of the acts. On the other hand, it is questionable whether I can can deliver an adequate moral assessment of the acts without delving into at least some of the motivational and political backdrop. This is because a discrete act of violence can be variously defensible and indefensible, depending on the nature of the circumstances that preceded it. In any event, I don’t want to go down that rabbit hole (at least not just yet!) nor be seen to be implying that the acts of October 7th are justifiable on grounds of “self-defence” or the like. Not at all. I mention the asymmetry simply to pre-empt potential confusion further on.

In the case of the October 7th attacks, two things have been happening. Among those who wish to “defend” Israel and its interests, many accuse the “other side” of intentionally trying to conflate explanation with justification. The idea here is that pro-Palestinian activists habitually engage in a rhetorical sleight of hand. They point to the fact that Gaza’s population has suffered under repeated Israeli military invasions over the past 20 years, resulting in significant loss of civilian life; to the fact of a stringent economic blockade on Gaza over the past 20 years or so; to the fact of being forcibly confined to a tiny sliver of densely populated land. And they note that, unsurprisingly, this has lead to a great deal of intense resentment, anger, hostility towards Israel — especially among young men.

The sleight of hand comes in by jumping from this descriptive set of claims to the normative claim that the attacks on October 7th can be justified on those grounds simply because they can be explained from a psychologically plausible perspective. But of course, as pointed out above, there is a logical gap here that would need to be bridged first.

The problem as I see it is this: some “pro-Palestinian” activists and commentators no doubt do engage in this sleight of hand. But not all do. And some commentators and activists genuinely are trying to understand and explain without necessarily implying or claiming that this justifies what happened on October 7th. One reason a person may want to understand and explain why such atrocities could take place, is in order to minimise the probabilities that similar atrocities recur in the future. To break cycles of violence.

And this is where some among those who wish to “defend” Israel are being disingenuous: they will refuse to entertain any attempt to explain or understand what could lead to such extreme resentment or anger towards Israel beyond sophomoric claims that it’s just some kind of primordial, irreducible “anti-semitism” or “hatred of western values” or “islamist fundamentalism”. This kind of superficial “explanation” echoes similar claims that were made in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The only permissible narrative among conservative commentators was that the terrorists attacked the US because they “hated freedom” and were consumed by islamist extremist dogma. And that no more needed to be said or considered.

The problem with this narrative is that it’s transparently implausible psychologically. Acts can be overdetermined; they can be psychologically and politically multifactorial. In fact, they almost always are. In the case of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it’s clear that it wasn’t only hatred of US lifestyle and culture combined with religious fundamentalism. It was also US military and political interventions and atrocities committed in the middle east over the preceding decades. Those were at least part of the self-justifying and motivational narratives the terrorists told to themselves and the world. Were they therefore “justified” in attacking and killing thousands of innocent civilians on 9/11? Obviously, definitively not. Those acts were moral atrocities, inexcusable, unjustifiable, monstrous. However, does this preclude the lesson that perhaps the US shouldn’t have been engaging in the kinds of military and political interventions and atrocities committed in the middle east throughout the preceding decades? Obviously not! But am I then denying that the hatred of US lifetsyle and culture, as well as religious fundamentalism, were not necessary conditions in order for those specific acts on 9/11 to be committed? Obviously not!

All of these things can be true at the same time: the terrorists were motivated by religious fundamentalism and hatred of US freedoms and culture — and wouldn’t have committed the 9/11 atrocities without those motivations; the terrorists were motivated by long-accrued resentments and hatreds towards the US government due to its history of military imperialism and political interferences in the middle east — and very probably wouldn’t have committed the 9/11 atrocities without those motivations; these latter motivations do not justify the 9/11 atrocities; however, from this point on, it is prudent to want to minimise the probability of further terrorist atrocities in the future by at least removing one of the motivational sources over which we have direct control — namely, ending the military imperialism and political interferences across the middle east.

Structurally similar points can be made in the context of the October 7th Hamas attacks: the terrorists were motivated in part by religious fundamentalism and hatred of Israeli jews (more on which below) — and wouldn’t have committed the atrocities without those motivations; the terrorists were motivated by long-accrued resentments and hatreds towards the Israeli state due to its history of accommodating settler expansion, dispossession, destructive military incursions into Gaza and the economic blockade — and very probably wouldn’t have committed the October 7th atrocities without those motivations; these latter motivations do not justify the October 7th atrocities; however, from this point on, it is prudent to want to minimise the probability of further terrorist atrocities in the future by at least removing one of the motivational sources over which Israel has some direct control — namely, ending the economic blockade, settler expansions in the West Bank, and seeking a two-state solution in accordance with international law.

Some will object here that Israel has already made peaceful overtures and offered the Palestinians a state and made various concessions in doing so; and that the Palestinians rejected such offerings and consistently chose violence over peaceful resolution of the conflict — however, this narrative is demonstrably false and in most cases the exact opposite of the truth (see here). And if one thinks about it for even a second, even on its face this narrative is implausible. For at least the last 40 years, Israel (due in large part to significant US military support) has been overwhelmingly the more powerful party in the diplomatic dynamic between the Palestinian side and the Israeli side. A strong, ever-present Zionist element within Israeli politics and wider Israeli society has always pushed for the eventuality that Israel will occupy the entire land between the mediterranean and the River Jordan. That it is theirs by historical and religous right. And so why would Israel suddenly do an about-face and grant the Palestinians a state in accordance with international law along the pre-June 1967 borders? Entailing as it would the secession of massive tracts of territory in the West Bank to the Palestinians, over which Israel currently has de facto control? Why would a more powerful party do that?

A common retort here is, “well, if Israel is as powerful and motivated by Zionist fervour as you say it is, why hasn’t Israel already simply committed a concentrated genocide/ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in the remaining territories of the West Bank and Gaza?” The answer is, however, pretty simple and obvious on a moment’s reflection: to commit such a rapid, concentrated, brutal genocide or ethnic cleansing would clearly draw the ire and opprobium of the rest of the world, and would seriously undermine the long-cultivated perception of Israel as a bastion of civilisation, democracy and rule of law in the middle east. A much more prudent and likely successful strategy is to perform an ethnic cleansing fitfully, surreptitiously, gradually, incrementally — using along the way the pretext of self-defence against terrorist resistance as a justification towards external and internal critics of the ongoing expansion of de facto political control eastward, and the periodic incursions into and economic sactions on Gaza. That way, Israel has a better of chance of saving some face on the international stage while at the same edging ever closer to the goal of establishing a Jewish majority state over the entire region between the mediterranean and the River Jordan.

Finally, a word on anti-semitism towards Israelis as a motivation among Gazans and Palestinians more generally. For many defenders of Israel, it’s taken as a kind of axiomatic truth that Israel’s enemies in the Arab world (and even beyond) are overwhelmingly motivated by a kind of primordial, bedrock, irreducible anti-semitism that admits of no further analysis. This strikes me again as sophomoric and totally implausible psychologically. A much more common-sense interpretation is that, after decades and decades of tensions between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews resulting from territorial conflict, dispossession, and violent contestation over the same land mass, it should be no surprise that in the minds of Palestinian Arabs, to be a Jewish person in that region is to be a person who cannot be trusted and whose interests are fundamentally at odds with one’s own. The same could be said in the other direction; after decades of witnessing rockets being launched from Gaza by Palestinian Arabs and various terrorist acts of retaliation, it would be perfectly understandable if some Israeli Jews harbored strong prejudices and resentments towards Palestinian Arabs. But does it follow from that that Israeli Jews are fundamentally “anti-Arab”? Of course not. Because not all Arabs are Palestinian Arabs; and not all Palestinian Arabs are people who will commit terrorist acts or even support/celebrate terrorist acts. However, it wouldn’t be surprising to discover that some do make that conflation of “Palestinian Arab” with “Arab”; and therefore have a more generalised prejudice. Likewise, it wouldn’t be entirely surprising to discover that some or even many Palestinian Arabs harbour deep resentment towards “jews” as a generalised category based on the political history of the region. But is that because of some primordial “jew hatred”? Obviously not. It has historical and political roots firmly set in the conflict. It does admit of further analysis. And to deny this would be disingenuous and deliberately obtuse in the extreme. And again, this wouldn’t be to justify that prejudice; anymore than it would in the case of observing that some Israeli Jews harboured deep prejudices against Palestinian Arabs! But understanding that prejudice is prudent; and trying to figure out which of the political factors that feed that prejudice we have some political control over, is a moral and political imperative.